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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated §78-2a3(2)(h), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee asserts that the correct standard of review for the issues presented
by the Appellant are as follows:
A.

Whether the Trial Court properly concluded that Karen Wood is a

creditor of the Estate of Raymond Wood?
Standard of Review. Generally the standard of Review of the Trial Court's
granting of summary judgment is based upon a standard of correctness, See Pigs
Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002). In the event the Court
determines that Karen Wood was a creditor of the Estate of Raymond Wood, then
Judge Halliday's Order denying Karen Wood's creditor claim signed the 101h day of
August, 2001, becomes the law of the case inasmuch as there has been no appeal of
said decision.
In the event the Court determines that Karen Wood is not a creditor of
the Estate of Raymond Wood, then pursuant to the Decree of Divorce filed Aprill4,
1987 the real property was awarded to Raymond Wood which Decree was not
appealed by Karen Wood and becomes the law of the case.
B.

Whether the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to determine

Karen Wood's Quiet Title claim to her residence and real property?
5

Standard of Review. Generally the Trial Court's granting of summary
judgment is reviewed on the basis of correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete
County, 43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002). However, at the time Judge Halliday entered the
Ruling on Summary Judgment both the Probate case and the Quiet Title action had
been consolidated and consequently Judge Halliday was presiding as the Judge over
the Quiet Title action as well as the Probate action at the time of the ruling on
summary judgement.
C.

Whether the issue of Karen Wood's interest in her residence and real

property was res judicata?
Standard of Review. The Trial Court's granting of summary judgment is
reviewed on the basis of correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43 P.3d
379 (Utah 2002).
D.

Whether the Probate Court had jurisdiction to determine the issues in

the Quiet Title action?
Standard of Review. It appears that this issue is the same as issue B above.
E.

Whether the divorce proceeding severed the joint tenancy and the

right of survivorship or specifically preserved the joint tenancy and survivorship to
secure the payment of Karen Wood's equity to her?
Standard of Review. Correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43
P .3d 379 (Utah 2002)
F.

Whether there was a disputed issue of material fact precluding the
6

grant of summary judgment?
Standard of Review. The Appellate Court reviews the Trial Court's granting
of summary judgment on the basis of correctness. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County,
43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002)
G.

Whether the Quiet Title action should have been consolidated with the

Probate action?
Standard of Review. The standard of review for the Trial Court's granting of
the Motion to Consolidate is an abuse of discretion standard. Parker v. Parker, 996
P.2d 565 (Utah Appeals 2000). It should be noted that the Notice of Appeal does
not provide notice of Appellant's desire to appeal Judge Bryner's Order
consolidating the Probate and Quiet Title action.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Most of the statements made in Appellant's Brief under this same heading are
accurate. The following statements, however, Appellee asserts are inaccurately
stated.
A.

Appellant at page 2 paragraph 4 of her brief states:
The real property remained in joint tenancy following the
divorce because Raymond Wood did not pay Karen Wood her equity
in the marital property. (R 35-37, 43)
Said statement is a legal conclusion, stated by Appellant, and is the very issue

this Court is called upon to decide and for which Colleen Wood personal
7

representative of Raymond Wood Estate asserts that the divorce proceedings
severed the joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The following additional facts
are pertinent to the issue.
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce which splits the personal property
reads as follows:
5.
That the marital assets be divided between the parties as
follows:
A. To Defendant: the 1974 mobile home and the real property
located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the indebtedness
thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the indebtedness
thereon; the 197 5 Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup truck; 1978 51h wheel
camp trailer; the Century boats; the 1982 Honda ATC 3-wheeler; the
dirt bike; the snowmobiles; and a portion of the furniture and
furnishings.
B. To Plaintiff: the 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion of the
furniture and furnishings; Plaintiffs personal belongings and those of
the minor children.
C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted judgment against
Defendant in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($1 0,000.00), the
same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items
outlined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said judgment shall
earn interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. (Quiet Title R. 33,
Addendum A)

The parties later entered into a subsequent Stipulation, a copy of which is
attached as Addendum A. The Stipulation reads in pertinent part as follows:
1.
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$5,600.00
payable $2,000.00 on or before April15, 1997 with the balance of
$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 the first payment being
due on or before April 30,1997 and like payments being due on or
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payment shall be
made by direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into Plaintiffs
account and Defendant shall bear all costs associated with the
8

arranging of said deposits.
2.
As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made,
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the event
any payment is not timely made; interest at the annual rate of 12%
shall computed from the date of this agreement and Plaintiff, upon
filing of an affidavit with the Court that payments have not been timely
made, shall be entitled to judgment against Defendant for the balance
owed, including accrued interest and attorney's fees incurred in the
preparation and filing of the Affidavit and judgment. Prior to filing an
Affidavit with the Court set forth in this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give
to Defendant ten (10) days advance written notice of the delinquency.
3.
Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed
Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties'
Decree of Divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the Deed to
Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or to a Title
Company within the event said Deed is necessary to enable Defendant
to refinance his property in order to satisfy his obligations hereunder.
4.
Upon the execution of this Stipulation, Defendant's
Petition to Modify and Petitioner's Counter Petition, Amended
Counter Petition and Order to Show Cause shall be dismissed and a
Trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be vacated.
5.
Each party hereby releases the other from any and all
obligations that may exist, or may, in the future, exist under the terms
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification
thereto. (Quiet Title R. 35-37)
B.

At page 2 paragraph 6 of Appellant's Brief, she states:
At the time ofhis death Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood the
judgment for her equity in the real property ....

Appellant asserts the following pertinent facts relating thereto. Judge Halliday in
the probate matter at page 138-139 of the record entered an Order denying
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creditor's alleged claim on the lOth day of August, 2001. Pursuant to the Order to
deny creditor's alleged claim Judge Halliday ordered:
1.
Respondent's Motion for leave to late file a
memorandum in opposition is denied due to the fact that Karen Wood
has had sufficient time in which to retain an attorney to file an
objection to the personal representatives Motion to Deny Creditor's
Claim.
2.
The time to file an objection has run and Respondent has
not filed an objection to the personal representative's motion.
3.
The personal representative filed a Notice to All
Creditors in the Emery County progress and Ms. Karen Wood did not
file a claim as required by Section 75-3-801(1) ofUCA.
4.
Ms. Karen Wood's alleged claim that the Estate of
Raymond D. Wood owes her money is denied.
5.
The personal representative is entitled to her attorney's
fees.
6.
Karen Wood is ordered to have Michael Harris release
the Deed of Trust. (Probate R: 114-115)
Karen Wood did not file an appeal ofthe Court's denial ofher Creditors
claim. (Probate R: 1-176)
C.

Appellant asserts at page 3 paragraph 3 of their Brief as follows:
The probate record has no proof that Notice to Creditors was
given or published as required by UCA §75-3-801. R. 1-176.
Appellant asserts the following facts in relation thereto.
The Appellant did not raise the issue as part of the summary judgment and

consequently did not preserve that issue for appeal. (Quiet Title R: 1-1 05)
Judge Halliday in its Order to Deny Creditors alleged claim dated August 10,
2001 specifically states:
3.

The personal representative filed a Notice to All
10

Creditors in the Emery County progress and Ms. Karen Wood did not
file a claim as required by Section 75-3-801(1) ofUCA. (Probate R:
114-115)
D.

At page 6, 6111 line from the top, Appellant states as follows:
The Memorandum acknowledged that Raymond Wood had not
paid Karen Wood the monies which were a condition precedent to the
delivery of the Quit Claim Deed to Raymond Wood from Karen
Wood's counsel Michael Harrison. R. 27, in Quiet Title action.
Appellant asserts that the actual language at page 27 of the Record reads as

follows:
Although it is unclear whether Raymond Wood paid all of the
money he was obligated to pay Karen Wood, (it is clear that the most
he would have owed was $3,600.00) Karen Wood was given the
opportunity to present a claim against the Estate of Raymond D.
Wood, but rather chose not to make that claim as required by statute.
(Quiet Title R:27)
E.

At page 7, first paragraph Karen Wood asserts:
Karen Wood executed a Quit Claim Deed which was to be held
by her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, for delivery to Raymond Wood
upon full payment of Karen Wood's equity in the home and real
property in order to "intentionally preserve and protect Karen Wood's
interest in the home and real property" R 41-45, 46-65, 65-85.
Appellee asserts the following facts:
The parties entered into a written Stipulation, the complete copy of which is

attached is Addendum A (Quiet Title R:35-37). No where in the Stipulation is there
a provision providing for Karen Wood to have a continued interest in the home and
real property but rather at most a lien against the real propetiy to secure a payment
of the amount set out therein. (Quiet Title R:35-37)
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The Stipulation specifically provides for the remedy to Karen Wood in the
event there is a default in the payment of the monies which is contained in paragraph
2 which reads as follows:
In the event any payment is not timely made, interest at the
annual rate of 12% shall be computed from the date ofthis agreement
and Plaintiff, upon filing of an Affidavit with the Court that payments
have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment against the
Defendant for the balance owed including accrued interest and
attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and filing of the Affidavit
and judgment. Prior to filing an Affidavit with the Court as set forth in
this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give to Defendant advance written notice
of the delinquency. (Quiet Title R: 35-37)
The Stipulation provided for $2,000.00 payment paid on or before April15, 1997
and the balance of $3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 beginning April30,
1997. If all of the payments were timely made, the final payment would have been
made on or before March 30,2000. (Quiet Title R: 35-37) Raymond Wood did not
pass away until July 17, 2000 (Probate R: 1) which would have been nearly four
months after the scheduled final payment pursuant to the parties' Stipulation.
In addition, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the stipulation in the Divorce
proceedings specifically acknowledges that Raymond Wood was awarded the
property in 1he Decree of Divorce. The pertinent portion of paragraph 3 of the
Stipulation reads as follows:
Upon the execution of this Agreement, Plaintiff shall place
with her attorney Michael A. Harrison an original executed Quit Claim
Deed to the property awarded to the Defendant in the parties' Decree
of Divorce. (Emphasis added.) (Quiet Title R: 35-37)
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F.

Appellant's assertions under the heading "Statement of the Facts" read nearly

verbatim to the statements under the heading "Statement of the Case"with the
exception of the second to the last paragraph of the Statement of Fact which reads:
The Trial Court in Quiet Title action granted the personal
representatives Motion for Consolidation on January 22, 2003, R. 98.
On January 22, 2003, the probate court granted the personal
representative's Motion for Summary Judgment upon the basis that
the decision in the probate matter is res judicata upon the issues
raised in Karen Wood's Quiet Title action. The Probate Court ruled
that Karen Wood became a creditor of Raymond Wood when she
agreed to a sum certain in the divorce action and that "All of her
rights, title or interest, in the property were modified from a property
interest to a secured creditor's interest." The Probate Court then
ruled that Karen Wood "failed to timely perfect a creditor's claim
[which] now prevents her from seeking to do indirectly what she was
prevented from doing directly." The Probate Court granted the
personal representative's Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissed the Quiet Title action of Karen Wood. R. 100-102.
The Probate Court was not the Court who entered the ruling on summary
judgment. Judge Halliday was sitting as the presiding judge over both the Probate
case as well as the Quiet Title action at the time he entered the ruling on summary
judgment.
The following portions ofthe record reflect the status of the Court at the
time of the ruling on summary judgment.
Pursuant to an Order on Order to Show Cause entered by Judge Halliday in
the probate case on the 291h of October, 2002, it reads in pertinent part:
1.
The Court recognizes there is an associated case with
Karen Wood wherein Karen Wood has filed a Quiet Title action which
bears case number 0107700169 and is set before Judge Bryner.
13

2.
The Court recognizes that Colleen Wood has filed a
motion asking Judge Bryner to consolidate the Quiet Title action into
this probate action and further has filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
3.
Until Judge Bryner rules on the Motion to Consolidate,
this Court will not enter a ruling with regard to the Quiet Title action,
but merely will leave the prior rulings of this Court in place until the
Motion to Consolidate has been ruled upon by Judge Bryner (probate
record 172-173).
On the 191h day of December, 2002, Judge Bryner signed his ruling on the
Motion to Consolidate which is contained at Quiet Title record page 98 which reads,
The motion to consolidate the above entitled case with probate
no. 00370013EI is granted in order to maintain a consistency. The
Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ruled on by the Honorable
Bruee K. Halliday of the Seventh District Court who is hearing the
said probate case. R. 98.
Judge Halliday in his order of dismissal contained Quiet Title Record at page
100 and 10 1 states in pertinent part:
"Judge Bryce K. Bryner has ordered this case No. 010700169
hereinafter No. 169, consolidated with probate case No. 00370013,
hereafter No. 13, and has requested that the Judge handling the later
case, in an attempt to expedite efficient handling of the cases, rule on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in Case No. 169. The
Court has reviewed the pleadings, reviewed the decision which it made
in the probate matter, and concludes that the Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds of the decision in the probate matter was and
is res judicata as to the ultimate issues raised in Plaintiffs Petition to
Quiet Title should be granted. I conclude that Case No. 169 is merely
an effort on the part of the Plaintiff to circumvent the Order in Case
No. 13 and avoid the operation ofthe statute of limitations question
which underlies the decision in the probate matter. To allow such an
effort would be a contravention of equity and justice herein. R. 100.

The following is a list of the facts set out in Colleen Wood's Motion for
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Summary Judgment (a complete copy of the motion, memorandum and exhibits are
attached as Addendum A) and forms the basis upon which summary judgment was
granted.
1.

On April14, 1987, a Decree of Divorce was entered by the Seventh

Judicial District Court of Emery County, wherein the PlaintiffKaren Wood, was
granted a Decree of Divorce against Raymond D. Wood (now deceased). See
attached copy ofthe Decree ofDivorce. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, paragraph SA, it reads:

A.
To Defendant [Raymond Wood]: The 1974 mobile home and
real property located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the
indebtedness thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the
indebtedness thereon; the Dodge fourwheel drive pick-up truck; the
1978 fifth-wheel camp trailer; the Century boat; the 1982 Honda ATV
three-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobile; and a portion of the
furniture and furnishings. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
3.

In exchange Karen Wood was awarded, pursuant to the Decree of

Divorce, judgment in the amount of$10,000.00. Paragraph 5C of the Decree of
Divorce reads:
C.
That Plaintiff [Karen Wood] shall and hereby is granted judgment
against defendant in the amount ofTEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000),
the same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items outlined
herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said judgment shall earn interest at
the statutory rate until paid in full. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
4.

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, issues arose

between Karen Wood and Raymond Wood regarding the payment of the judgment
entered pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and each of them filed Petitions with the
15

District Court in the divorce case to have their rights asserted. (Quiet Title R: 2122)
5.

The parties then entered into a Stipulation which resolved the

competing petitions to modify. (A copy of the stipulation is attached). Paragraphs 1
and 3 reads:
1.
Defendant [Raymond Wood] shall pay to Plaintiff [Karen Wood] the
sum of$5,600.00 payable $2,000.00 on or before Aprill5, 1997 with the
balance of $3,600.00 in monthly payments of $100.00 the first payment
being due on or before April30, 1997 and like payments being due on or
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payments shall be made by
direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into plaintiff's bank account
and defendant shall bear all costs associated with the arranging of said
deposits.
Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall place
3
with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed Quit Claim
Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties' decree of divorce.
Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the deed to Defendant upon payment of all
sums due hereunder or to a title company within the event said deed is
necessary to enable Defendant to refinance his property in order to satisfy
his obligation hereunder. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
6.

Pursuant to paragraph 5of the Stipulation entered into by the parties in

April of 1997, it states:
Each party hereby releases the other from any and all other
obligations that may exist or may, in the future, exist under the terms
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification
thereto. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
7.

Attached to this Memorandum is a copy of the check made payable to

Karen Woods in the amount of$2,000.00 dated Aprill5, 1997. (Quiet Title R: 2122)
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8.

Raymond Wood and Colleen Wood were married on the 26th day of

August, 1998 in Carbon County, Utah. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
9.

On the 17th day of July 2000, Raymond Wood passed away. (See

probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
10.

Upon the death of Raymond Wood, the Defendant herein, Colleen

Wood, the surviving spouse, was appointed the personal representative of the Estate
of Raymond Wood. (See attached Order). (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
11.

A Notice to All Creditors was published in the Emery County

Progress as provided in Section 75-3-801(1) of the Utah Code. (See probate#
003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
12.

Karen Wood failed to file Notice of Claim against the estate of

Raymond Wood. (See probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
13.

Colleen Wood then filed a Motion to Deny Creditor's Claim and

served notice of the motion on Karen Wood. (See probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet
Title R: 21-22)
14.

Judge Halliday ruled on the motion on the 1Oth of August 2001. Judge

Halliday ordered that Karen Wood's claim be denied and ordered that the deed be
recorded. (See attached Order) (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
15.

No appeal of the decision was filed. (See probate# 003700013 EI)

(Quiet Title R: 21-22)
16.

The Plaintiff Karen Wood was aware of her right to appeal the adverse
17

ruling of the probate court and consciously decided not to pursue the appeal. A copy
of a letter is attached hereto wherein Karen Wood acknowledges the time
limitations on the filing of an appeal. See attached letter dated September, 7, 2001
addressed to David and McKette Allred. (Quiet Title R: 21-22)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Karen Wood and Raymond Wood were divorced pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce entered by the District Court on the 9111 day of April, 1987. The District
Comi granted to Raymond Wood the real property located in Orangeville, Emery
County, State of Utah which was the only real property which the parties owned. In
addition, the Trial Court granted to each of the parties certain items of personal
property and then granted a judgment to Karen Wood (Appellant) of$10,000.00 to
equalize the equities in the real and personal property awarded to each of the parties.
Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-804 specifically severs the interest of a
spouse in property held at the time of divorce or annulment as joint tenants with
right of survivorship.
After Raymond Wood's death, Karen Wood failed to make any claim against
the Estate of Raymond Wood in the probate proceedings until after the personal
representative filed a motion to deny creditor's claims. Judge Halliday entered an
order in August of 2001 ordering that Karen Wood was not entitled to any claims
against the Estate of Raymond Wood.
The ruling in the probate case went unappealed by Karen Wood. The Decree
18

of Divorce entered by the divorce court in 1987 went unappealed by Karen Wood.
The award of real property to Raymond Wood in the divorce action and the
denial of any claim for reimbursement of money to Karen Wood in the probate case
now precludes Karen Wood from relief in her Quiet Title action wherein Karen
Wood seeks the Order of the Court that a right of survivorship was in effect and that
she should be awarded all interest in the real property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE
REAL PROPERTY IS RESOLVED PURSUANT TO THE
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS.

Raymond Wood and Karen Wood were divorced pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce signed the 9th day of April, 1987. A complete copy ofthe Decree of
Divorce is attached in Addendum A.
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is the division of the marital assets and
reads as follows:
5.
follows:

That the marital assets be divided between the parties as

A. To Defendant: the 1974 mobile home and the real
property located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the
indebtedness thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the
indebtedness thereon; the 1975 Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup truck;
1978 5th wheel camp trailer; the Century boats; the 1982 Honda ATC
3-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobiles; and a potiion of the
furniture and furnishings.
B. To Plaintiff: the 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion
19

of the furniture and furnishings; Plaintiff's personal belongings and
those of the minor children.
C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted judgment
against Defendant in the amount ofTen Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00), the same being approximately one-halfofthe equity in
those items outlined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said
judgment shall earn interest at the statutory rate until paid in full.

The only real property referred to in the Decree of Divorce is the real
property located in Orangeville, Emery County and is the real property at issue in
this Appeal.
The parties later filed Counter Petitions in the Divorce action to modify
which resulted in a Stipulation signed by the parties and filed in the divorce action
on April28, 1997. The Stipulation is 5 paragraphs long. A copy of the Stipulation is
attached as Addendum A. The 5 paragraphs read as follows:
1.
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$5,600.00
payable $2,000.00 on or before Aprill5, 1997 with the balance of
$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 the first payment being
due on or before April 30,1997 and like payments being due on or
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payment shall be
made by direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into Plaintiff's
account and Defendant shall bear all costs associated with the
arranging of said deposits.

2.
As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made,
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the event
any payment is not timely made; interest at the annual rate of 12%
shall computed from the date of this agreement and Plaintiff, upon
filing of an affidavit with the Court that payments have not been timely
made~, shall be entitled to judgment against Defendant for the balance
owed, including accrued interest and attorney's fees incurred in the
preparation and filing of the Affidavit and judgment. Prior to filing an
Affidavit with the Court set forth in this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give
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to Defendant ten (10) days advance written notice of the delinquency.
3.
Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed
Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties'
Decree of Divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the Deed to
Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or to a Title
Company within the event said Deed is necessary to enable Defendant
to refinance his property in order to satisfy his obligations hereunder.
4.
Upon the execution of this Stipulation, Defendant's
Petition to Modify and Petitioner's Counter Petition, Amended
Counter Petition and Order to Show Cause shall be dismissed and a
Trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be vacated.
5.
Each party hereby releases the other from any and all
obligations that may exist, or may, in the future, exist under the terms
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification
thereto.

This Court is called upon to interpret the Decree of Divorce and subsequent
Stipulation as set out above but no where in the language is there any reference to a
Right of survivorship in the property being preserved.
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-804 entitled Definition reads as follows:
75-2-804. Definitions - Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers
by divorce - Effect of severance - Revival - Protection of payors, third
parties, and bona fide purchasers- Personal liability of recipient- No
revocation by other changes of circumstances.

(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a
court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
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(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the
time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the Right of
survivorship, transforming the interests of the former spouses into tenancies
mcommon.
The statutory provisions set out above specifically severs Karen Wood's
right to the property unless there is an express term of a governing instrument, a
Court order or a contract providing for a Right of survivorship. No where in the
language in the Decree of Divorce or Stipulation of the parties is there an express
provision providing for a Right of survivorship of Karen Wood in the property at
issue, nor has Karen Wood made claim in her opposition to summary judgment or in
her brief that there exists such a written document.

POINT II
PAYMENT OF THE MONEY ORDERED PURSUANT TO THE
DIVORCE PROCEEDING WOULD RESOLVE ALL CLAIMS
AND PROVIDE A CLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST KAREN
WOOD'S CLAIMS TO QUIET TITLE.

The Decree of Divorce nor the subsequent Stipulation contemplated that
Karen Wood would be entitled to be paid the judgment and in addition be entitled to
ownership in the real property. The Stipulation attached in Addendum A provides
that upon payment of the money as agreed in the Stipulation that Raymond Wood
would be entitled to force Michael Harrison to turn over the Quit Claim Deed held
in his possession. The judicial determination of whether Raymond Wood owed
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Karen Wood any money pursuant to the parties' Stipulation was adjudicated in the
Probate Court. The Probate Court determined that Raymond Wood did not owe any
money to Karen Wood. (Probate R:ll4-115)
The Quiet Title action filed by Karen Wood is not a Quiet Title action where
you have competing claims because of discrepancy in property description; or
claims based upon adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence. The position
taken by Karen Wood is that she claims that she was not paid the money owed
pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and therefore mistakenly believes she is entitled
to the windfall of complete ownership in the property.

POINT III
THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED THE
APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR KAREN WOOD TO
ADJUDICATE HER ENTITLEMENT TO PAYMENT OF MONEY
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS.

Raymond Wood died on the 171h day of July, 2000. (Probate R: 01) Prior to
Raymond Wood's death, Karen Wood might have sought the help and assistance of
the divorce court had she believed that there was a claim for nonpayment of the
monies owed. Karen Wood's remedies for nonpayment of the amounts agreed upon
pursuant to the parties' Stipulation are quite clearly outlined in paragraph 2 of the
Stipulation attached in Addendum A which reads, in pertinent part:
In the event any payment is not timely made, interest at the
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annual rate of 12% shall be computed from the date of this agreement
and Plaintiff, upon filing of an Affidavit with the Court that payments
have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment against the
Defendant for the balance owed including accrued interest and
attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and filing of the Affidavit
and judgment. Prior to filing an Affidavit with the Court as set forth in
this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give to Defendant advance written notice
of the delinquency.
The Stipulation provided for $2,000.00 to be paid on or before Aprill5,
1997 and the balance of$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 beginning April
30, 1997. If all of the payments were timely made, the final payment would have
been made on or before March 30, 2000. Raymond Wood did not pass away until
July 17, 2000 which would have been nearly four months after the scheduled final
payment pursuant to the parties' Stipulation.
During said nearly four month period of time, Karen Wood did not send
written notice of any delinquency (or at least has not made any attempt to assert in
any ofthe proceedings that she had sent any notice to Raymond Wood of a
delinquency) nor did she return to the District Court in the divorce proceedings to
make any attempt to obtain a judgment as allowed pursuant to their Stipulation.
Once Raymond Wood passed away, the appropriate forum for Karen Wood to
assert any claims that she had for payment of money would fall within the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court, yet again Karen Wood did not make any attempt to
file a claim or assert a claim that any monies were still owed to her pursuant to the
parties' Stipulation. There was no effort on the part of Karen Wood to assert her
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claims for payment of money until after the filing of the Personal Representatives
motion to Deny Creditors Claim.
The Probate Court determined that Karen Wood had not timely filed her
creditor's claim and therefore denied any claims for money owed by the Estate of
Raymond Wood. The Order denying Karen Wood's claim went unappealed and has
been in place since the 1oth day of August, 2001. (Probate R: 114-115)
Had Karen Wood timely asserted her claims in the divorce proceedings prior
to Raymond Wood's death or even in a timely manner after Raymond Wood's death
pursuant to a creditor's claim, then the Court could have received evidence from
Karen Wood as to payments that had been made or payments that had not been made
but because of her untimeliness the Court has denied her right to seek any claims
against Raymond Wood's Estate which carries the same result as if the Court had
made a finding that all payments had been made pursuant to the parties' Stipulation.
It becomes even more apparent that the District Court reached the appropriate
results in light of the following example. If one assumes that Karen Wood had
timely asserted her claims either in the divorce proceedings or in the probate
proceedings and the Court for purposes of example determined that $500.00 had not
been paid pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, then an appropriate judgment would
have been entered and either Raymond Wood or his Estate would have paid the
$500.00 or Karen Wood would have been entitled to execute on the property of the
Estate for which she may or may not have chosen to foreclose on the real property.
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In the event, the Court allowed a foreclosure, any amounts above the amount owed to
Karen Wood would have been paid back to the Estate of Raymond Wood.

POINT IV
THE RULING BY THE PROBATE COURT THAT KAREN
WOOD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY MONEY FROM THE
ESTATE OF RAYMOND WOOD PRESENTED A COMPLETE
DEFENSE TO KAREN WOOD'S QUIET TITLE ACTION.

The denial of Karen Wood's claims against the Estate of Raymond Wood has
the same effect as an adjudication by the Probate Court that all monies owed
pursuant to the divorce stipulation had been paid by Raymond Wood. Karen Wood
asserts as part of her Quiet Title action that inasmuch as she claims that she was not
paid the money owed to her, that she is entitled to maintain a Right of survivorship
in the property. It becomes, perhaps even more apparent, that had Karen Wood
asserted her claims in the divorce proceedings prior to Raymond Wood's death and
had the divorce court determine that $5,600.00 as set out in the parties' Stipulation
had been paid to Karen Wood there would be little question as to the resolution in
the Quiet Title action. The divorce court clearly would have had the ability to
determine that all payments had been made to Karen Wood and that she was not
entitled to claims against any of the marital property of Raymond Wood. Because
the probate Court was the forum to determine whether payments had been made or
not does not change the end result that any claims that Karen Wood has to the real
property are a function of whether she was entitled to any money under the parties'
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Stipulation. Because the Probate Court determined that Karen Wood was not
entitled to any money from the Estate of Raymond Wood the ruling in the Probate
Court is res judicata and precludes recovery by Karen Wood in a Quiet Title action.
(See argument as set out in the original Motion for Summary Judgment attached in
Addendum A for a more expanded discussion regarding the res judicata effect of the
rulings in the divorce and probate actions.)

POINTV
DELIVERY OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED BY KAREN WOOD
TO HER ATTORNEY PRECLUDES HER FROM LATER
FILING A SURVIVOR AFFIDAVIT OR FURTHER
CONVEYANCE OF THE SAME PROPERTY.

Even if the Court were to reach the conclusion that the Decree of Divorce did
not sever the Right of survivorship to Karen Wood then the subsequent Stipulation
in the divorce proceedings entered into on the 25 1h day of April, 1997 with the
accompanying transfer of an original Quit Claim Deed signed by Karen Wood to her
attorney Michael Harrison would have severed any right of survivorship.
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-13 states in pertinent part:
A Quit Claim Deed, when executed as required by law, shall
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate
of the grantor in and to the premises therein prescribed and all right,
privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging, at the date of the
conveyance.
Pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, Karen Wood signed a Quit Claim Deed

27

for the property at issue and delivered the Deed to Michael A. Harrison her attorney.
Mr. Harrison, pursuant to the Stipulation was instructed to deliver the Deed to
Defendant upon payment of all sums due or to enable Mr. Wood to refinance his
property in order to satisfY his obligations pursuant to the Stipulation. The exact
language of the Stipulation is contained in paragraph 3 and cited verbatim in the
Statement of Facts herein. The delivery of the Quit Claim Deed to her attorney
Michael Harrison constituted a valid delivery of the Deed and precludes Karen
Wood from any further transfer including the filing of a Right of survivorship to the
property. The act of signing the Quit Claim Deed and delivering it to Michael
Harrison to hold pending payment of the monies agreed in the Stipulation
specifically in itself severs any Right of survivorship. The Utah Court of Appeals in
Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah App. 1994) ruled:

I. Dissolution of Joint Tenancy
When a joint tenant makes "a bona fide conveyance of his
inteTest in property to a third party, ... this has the effect of
terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership into a
tenancy in common." Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah
1979); accord Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622, 624-25
(Utah 1977); Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301
P .2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1956) Goint tenant who conveys or mortgages
reall property terminates joint tenancy and creates tenancy in
common).
"Either party to a joint tenancy may terminate it ... and ... the
consent of the other tenants to the severance or termination is not
required." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 16 at 343 (1981); accord
Nelson, 592 P.2d at 596, 597; Clearfield State Bank, 562 P.2d at
624-25.
The valid conveyance itself destroys the joint tenancy, and a
joint tenant need not notifY the other tenant or record the conveyance.
28

See Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91
(Cal. App. 1968) ("It was unnecessary in connection with the
execution of such a deed that there should be notification to the other
joint tenant and unnecessary that the deed be recorded; neither
acknowledgment {876 P.2d 879} or recordation is necessary."); 48A
C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 17 at 345.
"Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic or major incident
of an estate in joint tenancy." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3 at 302.
However, survivorship is an expectancy and not a future interest
because a joint tenant has but a "conditional opportunity of becoming
the owner of the whole interest." Estate ofBreckon v. Tax Comm'n,
591 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1979).
"The effect of a severance by a joint tenant is to terminate the
incident of survivorship as between him and the other joint tenants."
48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 19 at 351 (citing Tracy-Collins, 301 P.2d
at 1090); accord 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership§§ 14
& 16 at 108, 109 (1965).
Accordingly, Mrs. Crowther had no interest in the Property at
the time of her death, having transferred her interest to Mower, and
Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from a joint
tenancy to a tenancy in common.
II. Effect of Failure to Record
Crowther argues that Mrs. Crowther did not convey her interest
because Mower failed to record the deed prior to her death, or
alternatively, that Mrs. Crowther did not intend to transfer her
interest. We disagree.
A quit claim deed, "when executed as required by law shall have
the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the
grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such
conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1994). The fact that such a
deed is not recorded or that recording is delayed "does not affect the
validity of a document with respect to the parties to the document and
all other persons who have notice of the document." Utah Code Ann. §
57-3-2(3). In fact, Utah's recording laws "do not make recordation a
prerequisite to the validity of a deed." Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d
396, 398 (Utah 1983) (unrecorded deed valid against interest of
subsequent buyers who failed to record their own interest); Tarpey v.
Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P. 338, 339 (Utah 1887)
(unrecorded conveyance valid between parties and to all parties having
actual notice), affd, 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999
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(1891). Nor is compliance with the recording statute necessarily a
prerequisite to enforcing the terms of the deed. Larson v. Overland
Thrift & Loan, 818 P .2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991 ); cert. denied,
832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).

POINT VI
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS GRANTED BY THE QUIET
TITLE COURT NOT BY THE PROBATE COURT.
Karen Wood asserts that the District Court committed error because the
Probate Court should not enter a ruling in a Quiet Title action. Karen Wood
misconstrues the procedural status of the files at the time of the entry of the Ruling
on Summary Judgment. The probate case which is Case No. 003700013 EI was
originally presided over by Judge Halliday. The Quiet Title action which bears Civil
No. 0107700169 was originally assigned to Judge Bryner. The Motion to
Consolidate the cases and for Summary Judgment were filed in the Quiet Title
action Civil No. 010700169 seeking to consolidate the Quiet Title action into the
previously filed probate case before Judge Halliday.
In fact, pursuant to the Order on Order to Show Cause at record 172-173,
Judge Halliday makes the following Order on Order to Show Cause which reads in
pertinent part:
1.
The Court recognizes that there is an associated case
wherein Karen Wood has filed a Quiet Title action which bears case
no 0107700169 and is set before Judge Bryner.
2.
The Court recognizes that Colleen Wood Davis has filed
a motion asking Judge Bryner to consolidate the Quiet Title action
into this probate action and further has filed a motion for summary
judgment.
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3.
Until Judge Bryner rules on the Motion to Consolidate,
this Court will not enter a ruling with regard to the Quiet Title action,
but merely will leave the prior rulings of this Court in place until the
Motion to Consolidate has been ruled upon by Judge Bryner.
The Order on Order to Show Cause was signed by Judge Halliday on the 29th
day of October, 2002. The principle Memorandum in support of the Motion to
Consolidate and for Summary Judgment as well as Karen Wood's Memorandum in
opposition and the Reply Memorandum were all filed in the Quiet Title action.
Judge Bryner then ruled on the Motion to Consolidate which ruling is set out on
page 98 of the record wherein Judge Bryner rules as follows:
The Motion to Consolidate the above entitled case with
Probate No. 003700013EI was granted in order to maintain
consistency. The Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ruled on by
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, Judge of the Seventh District Court,
who is hearing the said probate case.
Subsequent thereto, on the 22"d of January, 2003, Judge Bruce K. Halliday
entered his ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment as set out in the Order of
Dismissal contained at record page 100-1 0 1.
The claim by Karen Wood that the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to
determine Karen Wood's claim to real property is mistaken. At the time that Judge
Halliday ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment, he was sitting as the judge not
only in the probate case but also in the Quiet Title action inasmuch as both matters
had been consolidated and assigned to Judge Halliday for consideration.
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POINT VII
THERE WERE NO AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. THE MATTER WAS DECIDED BASED UPON
PRIOR RULINGS IN THE DOMESTIC AND PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS.
Karen Wood asserts in her Brief that the Affidavits of the personal
representative should not be considered in that she believes they are defective
because they are not made upon personal knowledge.
The Quiet Title action contains all of the memorandums submitted by the
personal representative in support of the Motion for Consolidation and for Summary
Judgment. The Court can review the record which will show that there were no
affidavits of the personal representative Colleen Wood submitted in support of the
Motions for Summary Judgment. The basis for the Summary Judgment was based
upon the record in the divorce proceedings as to the parties' Stipulation and the
record in 1he Probate matter denying the creditor's claim of Karen Wood.

POINT VIII
IN ORDER FOR THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP TO BE
PRESERVED THERE MUST BE A WRITING.
The final argument made by Karen Wood in her brief asserts that regardless
of the language in the Stipulation in the divorce proceedings, it was the parties intent
to leave the Right of survivorship in place. The clear language of the written
documents leads one to the opposite conclusion as set out in the ruling by Judge
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Halliday. The statute sited in Point I requires a written document which outlines the
parties intent to maintain a right of survivorship and that in the absence of such a
writing that there can be no right of survivorship preserved. The Appellate Court can
reach its own conclusions based upon the reading of the Decree of Divorce and
Stipulation of the parties. The clear language of the Divorce Decree and Stipulation
do not make any provision for a right of survivorship and therefore the District
Court acted properly in granting summary judgment.
POINT IX
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE ENTITLED
TO COLLECT HER ATTORNEY'S FEES HEREIN.

Pursuant to the Court's Order denying creditor's claim in the probate matter,
paragraph 5 (R. 115) the personal representative was awarded her attorney's fees.
The personal representative asked the Court as part of the Motion for Summary
Judgment for an award of attorney's fees. Judge Halliday did not address the issue
in his Order granting summary judgment.
The substance ofthis appeal is a request on the part ofKaren Wood to
interpret the Orders in the divorce proceedings with regard to her right to
survivorship in the marital real property. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3,
the Court has the ability in domestic cases to order the payment of attorney's fees
and the personal representative requests that the Court awarded the Estate its fee.
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CONCLUSION

Appellee respectfully requests this Court to confirm the decision of Judge
Halliday in granting summary judgment and requests that the Court of Appeals award
the personal representative or the Estate of Raymond Wood her costs and attorney's
fees herein.
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